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Cosmic Spiritualism among the Pythagoreans, Stoics,
Jews and Early Christians
Phillip Sidney Horky
13.1 Introduction
It is a curious feature of human reasoning that it enjoys the use of analogies
in order to explain the inexplicable: in Ancient Greece, from Homer
onward we are constantly confronted with, for example, gods in human
form, with human attributes that are often pushed to extremes.1
Something striking, however, happened in the late sixth century bce:
Greek intellectuals began to criticise this representation of the gods and,
by extension, the parts of the kosmos that the gods either were thought to
embody2 or to which they were thought to be assigned governance.3
Instead, a new sort of ‘god’ arrived on the scene, one differentiated by its
lack of human features, while at the same time being marked by its
perfection and comprehension. Xenophanes of Colophon called this god
‘Intellect’ or ‘Mind’ (Nous), retaining the most positive attribute of the
most authoritative gods in the Greek (Zeus) and Indo-Iranian
(Ahura Mazda) pantheons.4 This move would be decisive historically: for
centuries –well into the second century ce – philosophers like Anaxagoras,
Diogenes of Apollonia, Plato, the Early Platonists, and the Stoics would
follow Xenophanes in positing an intelligent god, and extend his creative
activities beyond himself in the act of cosmogony.5The ﬁrst material object
constructed by this intelligent god was the kosmos, the all-encompassing
1 The classic work on analogy in ancient Greece remains Lloyd 1966, especially pp. 192–209.
2 As in the case of Mesopotamian and Orphic cosmogonies. For an excellent general discussion, see
Burkert 2008.
3 As in the case of Homeric and Hesiodic theogonies.
4 Xenophanes DK 21 B 10–26. Generally, on the distinctiveness of Xenophanes’ Nous, see Benzi 2016.
On the usually unremarked interrelationships between Greek philosophy and Zoroastrian theology,
see Horky 2009.
5 Anaxagoras DK 59 B 13; Diogenes of Apollonia DK 64 B 4–5; Pl. Phlb. 30d and Ti. 39d; for the Early
Platonists, see Speusippus Frs. 89–91 IP; Xenocrates Fr. 133 IP²; for the Stoics, see L&S 46 A–B.
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universe that was, one way or another, ordered and differentiated.6
Similarly, in Hebrew traditions that are roughly contemporary, accounts
of the generation of the universe and all its parts arise, and in the text of
Genesis we see Yahweh as a primal cultivator, differentiating the parts of
the kosmos, fashioning the manifold creatures to inhabit it, and assigning
the human being the task of terrestrial oversight.7 The adaptation of
Hebrew traditions in the writings of early Christianity, starting from the
latter part of the ﬁrst century ce, sees the birth of a new spiritual cosmol-
ogy, a celebration of the ‘last’ Adam and son of God who is to inherit the
kingdom of heaven in the promise of apocalyptic fulﬁlment suggested by
some of the more prophetic works of the Hebrew Bible.
It is agreed that πνεῦμα, which normally translates as ‘breath’ but
eventually comes to mean ‘spirit’ in a marked sense, plays a fundamental
role in the latter tradition, marking the ﬁlial inheritance of early
Christianity from Judaism and setting out a new path of spiritual cosmol-
ogy – a return of Man to the paternal source that had originally bestowed
upon him life.8 What is not often noted, however, is that much of the
pneumatic theology that is found in the New Testament, which would
come to exercise a tremendous effect on the world after Christianity’s
triumph in the Late Roman Empire, shows remarkable inheritances also
from the secularising, scientiﬁc tradition of the Greek philosophical cos-
mology. For, as I will argue in this chapter, it is with Paul that we see not
only the bridging of the Hebrew and Indo-European traditions of cosmo-
gonic and anthropogonic pneumatics – that had already been anticipated
by his predecessor Philo of Alexandria, a Hellenic Jew who was additionally
a Platonist/Stoic philosopher – but also a subsuming of the scientiﬁc
tradition under a notion of divine pneumatics that has an active role in
religious teaching, understanding and even prophetics. Analogies with
earlier pagan usages will be retained, but they will also be adapted to new
and emergent spiritual concerns that eventually brought the Christian
community together – the natural and logical extension of what the
Stoics had thought was the primary ontological and natural function of
‘breath’. Hence, I will approach the topic of cosmic spiritualism by tracing
the history of the pneumatic cosmogony/anthropogony analogy, from its
earliest expression in the lost works of the Pythagoreans, through the Stoics
who adapted and modiﬁed it, including the deeply inﬂuential Posidonius
6 See e.g. Anaxagoras DK 59 B 12–13; Diogenes of Apollonia DK 64 B 2–3; Pl. Ti. 31c–32a.
7 Genesis 1:1–31.
8 It is important to note from the beginning that the word for ‘breath’ and ‘spirit’ is the same in Greek:
πνεῦμα. ‘Breath’ originates in Old English as bræð, and ‘spirit’ is an Anglicisation of Latin spiritus.
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of Apamea and the remarkable and understudied Jewish philosopher
Philo of Alexandria, to the texts of the New Testament, especially the
creative re-imaginings of Paul.9
13.2 Origins of Cosmic Breathing: The Pythagoreans
Perhaps the very earliest evidence in the Western world of ‘breath/spirit’
(Greek πνεῦμα) occupying a formative place in both cosmic and human
generation is associated with the enigmatic philosopher Pythagoras of
Samos, who died in the ﬁrst few decades of the ﬁfth century bce.10 The
evidence is, as is often the case with ancient philosophers who left no
writings, late and subject to bias, but it nevertheless gives us a good starting
point for our analysis of breath in the Hellenistic and Post-Hellenistic
worlds, and beyond. Our materials come from Aristotle’s lost text On the
Philosophy of Pythagoras, probably written in the mid fourth century bce,
and it is as potent as it is enigmatic (a common problem for evidence
regarding early Pythagoreanism). But it is conﬁrmed and expanded by two
other pieces of evidence, the ﬁrst from Aristotle’s Physics itself, and
the second given by Simplicius in his much later commentary on that text:
A. In the ﬁrst book of On the Philosophy of Pythagoras, he [Aristotle] writes
that heaven is one, and that time and breath, i.e. void, which differentiates
the spaces of each thing in each case, was drawn in from the inﬁnite; for
there is a ﬁery place on the inside.
ἐν δὲ τῷ Περὶ τῆς Πυθαγόρου φιλοσοφίας πρώτῳ γράφει τὸν μὲν οὐρανὸν
εἶναι ἕνα, ἐπεισάγεσθαι δ’ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπείρου χρόνον τε καὶπνοὴν καὶ τὸ κενόν,
ὃ διορίζει ἑκάστων τὰς χώρας ἀεί· ἔνδοθεν γὰρ εἶναι τόπον πύρινον.11
(Stobaeus, Eclogues 1.18.1 c = Aristotle, Fr. 201 Rose³ = DK 58 B 30; tr.
after Bernabé and Mendoza)
B. The Pythagoreans, too, held that void exists and that it enters the
heaven from the inﬁnite breath, the kosmos inhaling also the void
which distinguishes the natures of things as if it were what separates
and distinguishes the terms of a series.
εἶναι δ’ ἔφασαν καὶ οἱΠυθαγόρειοι κενόν, καὶ ἐπεισιέναι αὐτὸ τῷ οὐρανῷ ἐκ
τοῦ ἀπείρου πνεύματος ὡς ἀναπνέοντι καὶ τὸ κενόν, ὅ διορίζει τὰς φύσεις,
9 For a useful general study of Paul’s relationship to Jewish and Hellenistic (including Stoic and
Platonist) wisdom, see especially Alexander 2001.
10 Themost informative paper I have read on this subject remainsMalcolm Schoﬁeld’s ‘Pythagoras the
Plagiarist’ (n.d.).
11 Text from Primavesi 2018.
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ὡς ὄντος τοῦ κενοῦ χωρισμοῦ τινὸς τῶν ἐφεξῆς καὶ [τῆς] διορίσεως.
(Aristotle, Physics 4.6.213b22–6; tr. after Hardie and Gaye)
C. They [the Pythagoreans] used to say that the void penetrates the kosmos,
as if the latter inhaled it or exhaled it like a breath of what is diffused around
it from the outside.
ἔλεγον γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι τὸ κενὸν ἐπεισιέναι τῷ κόσμῳ οἷον ἀναπνέοντι ἤτοι
εἰσπνέοντι αὐτῷ ὥσπερ πνεῦμα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔξωθεν περικεχυμένου˙
(Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics p. 651.39–41 Diels; tr. after
Bernabé and Mendoza)
Hence, we see the ultimate beginnings of a mode that employs biological
analogy to the purpose of explaining nothing less than the constitution of
the entire well-ordered universe. This theory could be thought to set in
motion what would, inevitably and after much mathematical speculation,
lead to the modern concept of the oscillating expansion and retraction of
the universe, often associated with the oscillating universe version of the
‘big bang’. For the early Pythagoreans, the universe is understood to
function, to live, as an animal – once it has been constituted and its parts
set into motion, it inhales and exhales ‘breath’ from the inﬁnity that
surrounds it (perhaps explaining, by analogy, the expansion and contrac-
tion of the ordered universe), and from which it differentiates itself and its
individual natures.12The vehicle for this differentiation is void, or the space
that is occupied by matter, and that is like ‘breath’.13 The push and pull
that demonstrates the universe’s capacity for breathing in the void which
(now) articulated matter occupies as the universe takes form.14 The sign
that the universe and its constituents are properly differentiated from what
is chaotic and disorderly is the persistent motion indicated by regular
respiration.
It had been common to anthropomorphise the gods among the Greeks,
assuming that Zeus and Hera, Apollo and Athena, were sort of ‘super-
12 Aristotle probably means ‘natures’ here in the sense of ‘substances’.
13 Even if the concept of the void was an invention of the Eleatics, as Schoﬁeld (n.d.) hypothesises, the
evidence could certainly be taken to refer to early Pythagorean philosophy in the wake of challenges
brought by Parmenides’ and Zeno’s philosophy. For a similar approach to Pythagoreanism in the
two generations after Pythagoras’ death, see Horky 2013: 131–49.
14 Beyond this very general description (which no doubt some will ﬁnd anachronistic), it is unfortu-
nately impossible from this information to deduce exactly what sort of ‘void’ is implied here. Did the
Pythagoreans conceive of this void as absolute space, or as relative spaces between parts of the kosmos?
Or is it possible that the Pythagoreans conceived of void as both absolute space (within which matter
as a whole is situated) and the relative spaces between the parts of the kosmos after cosmogony? I am
inclined towards the latter view, but this could be impossible to adjudicate, given the challenges with
establishing the Aristotelian source text. For further thoughts, see Primavesi 2018: 122–25.
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humans’ who, while they did not of course die, nevertheless had the
physical and especially emotional attributes of human beings, usually to
extreme levels. Hence, we see that the Homeric gods breathe: in par-
ticular, they ‘breathe into’ humans certain insights – their breathing is
a kind of divine gift or guidance, not at all indicative of their mortality,
but rather the mark of their immortality.15 This is of course not unlike
what we see in the Hebrew Scriptures, especially the famous creation of
the ﬁrst human in Genesis 2.7, or its expansion in the Gospels in the
New Testament, both of which we will discuss later on. But with the
advent of Pythagorean philosophy in Greece16 something had changed:
the kosmos itself, understood in speculatively biomorphic terms, was now
being associated with a uniﬁed, living being, whose self-constitution was
regulated through its primal activity of breathing. The effect was
immediate. Charles Kahn has argued that Xenophanes, whom we men-
tioned earlier, went so far as to reject a Pythagorean notion of cosmic
respiration in his description of the god Mind.17 Not much later,
Empedocles, who was associated with the Pythagoreans by Hellenistic
historiographers,18 speculated about the workings of animal respiration,
comparing it with the motion of clepsydra; this is not necessarily the
same thing as cosmic breathing – the Pythagorean analogy is bio-
morphic, and the Empedoclean mechanical – but the analogy is none-
theless said to apply to all things in Empedocles’ universe.19 Indeed, the
growth and expansion of the kosmos is analogous to what happens in
animal birth about a generation later, in the writings of the mathemat-
ical Pythagorean Philolaus of Croton (ﬂ. 420s–10s bce), who, according
to Aristotle’s student Meno, observed:
Immediately after birth, the animal breathes in the external air, which is
cold. Then it sends it out again like a debt. Indeed, it is for this reason that
there is desire for external air, so that our bodies, which were too hot before,
by the drawing in of breath from the outside, are cooled thereby.
15 E.g. Hom. Od. 19.138.
16 Bernabé and Mendoza (2013) demonstrate the close connections between this Pythagorean account
of the cosmogony and that of the Rig Veda.
17 Kahn 2001: 36, by reference to DK 21 A1.19 = D.L. 9.19.
18 Empedocles’ relationship with Pythagoreanism remains difﬁcult to pin down, although he was
associated with the Pythagorean pretenders by Neanthes of Cyzicus (FGrHist 84 F 26 = D.L. 8.55)
and Timaeus of Tauromenium (FGrHist 566 F 14 = D.L. 8.54). For Empedocles as ‘democratising’
Pythagorean, see Horky 2013: 116–19 and especially 2016.
19 The fragment literally claims that ‘all things’ (πάντα) respire the way Empedocles describes (DK 31
B 100), but it is Aëtius (DK 31 A 74) who interprets this as referring to the ﬁrst animal. Generally, on
this material, see Lloyd 1966: 328–33.
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με[̣τὰ γὰρ] τὴν ἔκτεξιν εὐθέως〚το〛τὸ ζῷον ἐπιστᾶται τὸ ἐκτὸς πνεῦμα
ψυχρὸν ὄν˙ εἶτα πάλιν καθαπερεὶ χρέο̣ς ἐκπέμπει αὐτό. διὰ τοῦτο δὴ καὶ
ὄρ̣εξις τοῦ ἐκτὸς πνεύματος, ἵνα τῆ[ι] ἐπ<ε>ισάκτῳ τοῦ πνεύματος ὁλκῇ
θερμ[ό]τερα̣ ̣ ὑπάρχοντα τὰ ἡμέτερα σώματα πρὸς αὐτοῦ καταψύχηται.
(Philolaus of Croton DK 44 A 27; tr. by Huffman)
That animal breathing expressed the intelligence, and the intelligibility, of
the universe was suggested by Diogenes of Apollonia, who found in
breathing (ἀναπνέοντα) the ‘signiﬁcant evidence’ (μεγάλα σημεῖα) that
both humans and other animals possessed intelligence (νόησις).20 Such an
analogy would take hold in remarkable ways throughout antiquity,
informing many accounts that sought to combine the scientiﬁc with the
ethical, the philosophical with the spiritual.
13.3 Breath as Sustaining Power: The Stoics and Posidonius
of Apamea
The Pythagoreans’ pneumatic cosmogony was generally ignored by
fourth-century bce philosophers, perhaps due to the authoritative cos-
mogonic visions that were presented by Plato and Aristotle.21 There is
some indication that Aristotle’s student, Theophrastus, identiﬁed God
with both the heavens and breath, but it is unclear how this association
is supposed to be understood.22 Moreover, due to scarcity of evidence, it
is difﬁcult to know whether the Pythagorean model offered traction to
the early Stoics of the late fourth and third centuries bce, but there are
some suggestions that it did. It was adopted by the remarkable second-
century bce philosopher Posidonius of Apamea, whose investigations
into nature reﬂected a particular declension of Stoicism:23
The kosmos, they24 say, is one and this is limited, having a spherical shape;
for a shape of this sort is most suitable for motion, according to Posidonius
in the ﬁfth book of hisNatural Reason and the followers of Antipater in their
20 DK 64 B 4.
21 Plato expressly rejected the notion that the World-Soul breathed or practised physical activities
analogous to human life (Ti. 33c1–34a7), on which see Broadie 2012: 92–94. For further discussion of
Plato and Aristotle, see the contributions by Brisson, Johnson, Gagné, and Boys-Stones (Chapters 6,
4, 9 and 5, respectively).
22 Clem. Protr. 5.66.5 = Theophrastus F 252B FHS&G: ‘And that man from Eresus, Theophrastus, the
associate of Aristotle, supposes in one place that God is heaven (οὐρανόν), and in another that He is
breath (πνεῦμα)’.
23 The quotation also mentions the ‘followers of Antipater’, but Posidonius’ ﬁfth book of his Natural
Reason is expressly cited.
24 The Stoics are intended here.
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works On the Kosmos. Outside this [sc. the kosmos] is diffused the unlimited
void, which is incorporeal. By ‘incorporeal’ they mean that which, although
it is capable of being occupied by corporeal things, is not occupied by them.
There is no void in the kosmos, but it is wholly uniﬁed. For this [sc.
uniﬁcation] necessarily results from reciprocal breathing and tension of
the heavenly things towards the terrestrial things [τοῦτο γὰρ ἀναγκάζειν
τὴν τῶν οὐρανίων πρὸς τὰ ἐπίγεια σύμπνοιαν καὶ συντονίαν]. (Posidonius
of Apamea Fr. 8 Kidd = Diogenes Laertius 7.140)
Posidonius adapts the Pythagorean cosmogony to a Stoic framework,
elaborating a more complex theory of corporeals (i.e. bodies, or three-
dimensional material objects) and incorporeals (i.e. empty space) accord-
ing to the principle of potentiality: void is incorporeal, i.e. a space that
could be occupied by corporeals, but currently is not. Void as such does not
exist in the kosmos, but rather the persistent ‘reciprocal breathing’
(σύμπνοια) and ‘tension’ (συντονία) of the heavenly towards the earthly
things indicates that all space within the ordered universe is, at all times,
occupied by corporeal matter. Importantly, for Posidonius, as for earlier
Stoics, the soul is deﬁned as a ‘hot breath’ (πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον) and is matter,
and it is soul that is said to ‘hold together’ bodies, ‘just as glue controls both
itself and what is outside’ (ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ κόλλα καὶ ἑαυτὴν καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς
κρατεῖ).25 In this way, soul, as hot breath, manifests a sort of ‘tension’
between things that brings coherence and cohesion between what is inter-
nal and what is external:26 in this cosmic situation, the external is what is
on the heavenly ‘outside’ or the edge of the ordered universe, and the
internal is what is circumscribed under it. It is doubtful, however, that
Posidonius understood the ‘outside’ to be in the inﬁnite void beyond the
heavenly outer rim of the universe, as the Pythagoreans did.27 Perhaps at
this point it is worth pointing out that, for Posidonius, the kosmos was
deﬁned as the ‘systematic compound composed out of heaven, earth, and
the natural constituents in them’ (σύστημα ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἐν
τούτοις φύσεων).28 Posidonius’s strict commitment to materialism within
the ordered universe reveals itself in the claim that soul, as hot breath, is
25 Fr. 149 Kidd. For an excellent general discussion of Stoic pneuma and its antecedents in Hellenistic
medicine, see Hankinson 2002: 298–301.
26 For the Stoics, heat and cold are ‘active’ powers, whereas earth and water are ‘passive’
elements (cf. Nemesius p. 164.15–18 Matthaei = L&S 47 D).
27 Here Posidonius follows Plato, who, contrary to the Pythagoreans, claims that the kosmos, as
a perfect sphere, did not breathe in the outside air (Ti. 33c).
28 Fr. 14 Kidd. Note that a second deﬁnition is also added that explains the ﬁrst: ‘a systematic
compound composed out of gods, men, and what has come into being for their sake’. Compare
these deﬁnitions with that of ps-Aristotle,On the Kosmos 391b9–12, and Chrysippus (SVF 2.527.1–3 =
Arius Didymus Fr. 31), both discussed by Johnson in Chapter 4.
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qualiﬁed matter, unlike the breath of the Pythagorean cosmogony, which
was immaterial and described even as the void.29 Indeed, someone might
object that it would be absurd if ‘void’, i.e. the dimensions of external
‘space’, were to ‘insert itself’ into or ‘penetrate’matter, as the Pythagoreans
held in their biomorphic model of cosmology.30
Posidonius’ account of breath as ‘tension’ taps ﬁrmly into Stoic ortho-
doxy. For ‘breath’, as we saw, is the rariﬁed matter or stuff that, when
qualiﬁed as ‘hot’,31 actively constitutes soul, which itself makes sure that
bodies remain uniﬁed as such (and identiﬁable as what-they-are). Or,
another way to put it, ‘breath’ sustains animate corporeal objects-as-such.32
What, then, does Posidonius mean by the rariﬁed stuff or matter that is
‘breath’? Here we see a fascinating, if challenging, pair of Stoic notions
come into play: breath as the ‘tension’ (συντονία) among corporeal objects,
or as the ‘tenor’ (τόνος or ἕξις) within them.33 ‘Tension’ could be under-
stood as the means by which diverse objects are able to interact successfully.
It is fundamental, as we saw earlier with Posidonius, for the sustenance of
the universe as an orderly composition of divine and mortal elements that
belong in it. The metaphor employed by the Stoics for this aspect of
‘breath’ is both musical and biological: in Aristotle, it refers to the kinds
of harmonic concords that are high-pitched,34 but it is not a simple
metaphor for psychic or political ‘harmony’.35 Of more relevance to our
study of the Stoics, in the case of biology, Aristotle uses ‘tension’
(συντονία) to describe the quality of the sinews that connect the parts of
animal bodies. In animals at their prime, the joints and sinews are more
tense, whereas both prior and posterior to that age, they are more slack.36
29 As Long helpfully puts it (1996: 227), ‘The Stoics had reasons . . . for insisting that the soul is
corporeal; but those reasons fall within a general conceptual framework which denies that anything
can exist which is not a body or a state of a body’.
30 Compare again Plato’s rejection of the presence of void inside the animate being in his discussion of
breathing (Ti. 79b–c).
31 Galen testiﬁes that the breath which constitutes the soul’s commanding faculty possesses two
elements/qualities, which are ‘air and ﬁre’/‘cold and hot’ (L&S 47 H).
32 See e.g. Galen’s description of the physics involved (L&S 47 F): ‘The chief proponents of the
sustaining power [συνεκτικὴ δύναμιν], such as the Stoics, make what sustains one thing, and what is
sustained something different: the breathy substance is what sustains [πνευματικὴ οὐσία τὸ
συνέχον], and the material substance what is sustained [ὑλικὴ τὸ συνέχομενον]. And they say that
air and ﬁre sustain, and earth and water are sustained.’
33 The terminology is inconsistent and depends on whether the evidence base is original to a Stoic or
a critic. For example, Chrysippus himself probably used ἕξις, whereas the same concept appears to
have been reinterpreted by later authors as τόνος.
34 Arist. Pol. 8.7.1341b36–41.
35 On the political deployment of κόσμος, see Atack’s contribution to this volume (Chapter 8).
36 Arist. GA 5.7.787b6–19.
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Hence, so Aristotle argues, animals in their prime, when their sinews and
joints are most ‘tense’, are strongest, and he gives as evidence for this
mature bulls, who, according to him, have particularly sinewy hearts,
which, thanks to the high tension in their ﬂesh, produce the tense breath-
ing that one observes when a bull breathes.37 ‘Tension’ thus understood
appears to be a force that marks the optimal physical conditions for system-
wide performance, and hence it is no surprise that Posidonius, as
a committed teleologist, adapted Aristotle’s biological usage to his pneu-
matic cosmology.
The evidence for Stoic breath as internal ‘tenor’ (τόνος or ἕξις) is more
substantial, but also more variegated and complex. First, we should con-
sider the relationship between ‘tension’ and ‘tenor’, before going on to
describe how ‘tenor’ was thought by the Stoics to be a species of the genus
‘breath’. Now the best evidence for the relationship between external
‘tension’ and internal ‘tenor’ comes from the Christian bishop and phil-
osopher Nemesius of Emesa, who ﬂourished in the fourth century ce:
Now if the soul is a body of any kind at all, even if it is of the rarest
consistency, what is it that sustains it [sc. the soul]? For it has been proved
that every body needs something to sustain it, which is an endless regress
until we reach something incorporeal. If they should say, as the Stoics do,
that there exists in bodies a kind of tensile movement [τονική κίνησις] which
moves simultaneously inwards and outwards, the outward movement pro-
ducing quantities and qualities, and the inward one unity and substance, we
must ask them (since every movement issues from some power), what this
power is and in what substance it consists. (Nemesius, On Human Nature
pp. 70.6–71.4 Matthaei = Long & Sedley 47 J; tr. by Long and Sedley)
As Long and Sedley note in their commentary on this passage, ‘this is
the most precise surviving testimony concerning the internal effects of
πνεῦμα within a compound body’.38 We should add that it is also the
most precise surviving testimony on the relationship between ‘tension’
and ‘tenor’. As we saw earlier, ‘tension’ occurs between bodies within
a complex ‘system’, whereas ‘tenor’ is within an individual body as such.
How do these relate? We can only conjecture, but Nemesius’s passage
gives us some grounds to do so. ‘Tensile movement’ goes both outwards
and inwards: the outwards breathing of, say, an animal is the power that
produces – or more literally ‘brings to completion’ (ἀποτελεστική) –
qualities and quantities, which we can perceive in one another: hence,
we might say that Aristotle’s bull is ‘swollen with anger’ when we
37 Ibid. 38 L&S vol. II, p. 282.
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perceive the bull’s exhalation.39 Contrariwise, the inwards breathing of
an animal is what guarantees its unity, its identiﬁability as an individual
substantial body – this animal;40 in the absence of breath, the individual
substance no longer exists, and this is the animal’s ‘death’.41 After the
matador has delivered the ﬁnal blow, the bull, who cannot inhale breath
because he has respired, ceases to be Aristotle’s bull as such: he is no
longer, from a metaphysical and epistemological point of view, identiﬁ-
able as this individual bull, and the failure to inhale indicates the
beginning of the partition of the bull’s physical body into (what will
eventually become) an inﬁnite number of material parts or pieces. The
same could be said, we would imagine, of all individual compound
animate substances, whether they are animals of lower epistemic and
aretaic capacities such as Aristotle’s bull, or sages who possess full
rational capacities, like Socrates.
What about individual simple substances within the broader physical
world, such as ‘this rock’ or ‘this piece of iron’? While they are, from our
perspective, ‘inanimate’, i.e. they lack soul, the Stoics were so deeply
committed to their comprehensive pneumatic cosmology that they
believed objects such as ‘this rock’ and ‘this piece of iron’ to – in some
qualiﬁed sense – ‘breathe’. This makes some sense, at least in accordance
with the Stoics’ unique conceptualisation of internal breathing as ‘tenor’,
i.e. the breathing that guarantees an individual corporeal object’s existence
as such. On the subject of their ‘innate breath’, Galen provides us with
further evidence of division of the genus ‘breath’ into several species:
‘physical’ or ‘natural’ (τὸ φυσιχόν) breath, ‘animate’ (τὸ ψυχικόν) breath,
and ‘tensile’ (τὸ ἑκτικόν) breath, which corresponds to the ‘tenor’ (ἕξις or
τόνος) we just discussed:
There are two kinds of innate breath, the physical kind [τὸ φυσικόν] and the
animate kind [τὸ ψυχικόν]. Some people [sc. the Stoics] also posit a third,
the tenor kind [τὸ ἑκτικόν]. The breath which sustains stones is of the tenor
kind, the one which nurtures animals and plants the physical, and the
animate breath is that which, in animate beings, makes animals capable of
39 If this is indeed how to read the reference to ‘quality and quantity’, the former of which is literally
‘magnitude’ (μεγεθός). Plutarch apparently quotes Chrysippus (De Rep. Stoic. 1053f = L&S 47M) as
claiming that tenors are ‘currents of air’ which sustain bodies, and that speciﬁc essential qualities in
simple bodies are owed to the power of the sustaining currents of air, e.g. hardness in iron, density in
stone and whiteness in silver. What Chrysippus would have said about complex or compound
bodies like animals is unclear and must remain conjectural. See Long 1996: 230.
40 Or so I understand the appeal to οὐσία, in an Aristotelian sense of an ‘individual’ or a τόδε τι.
41 Again, a reformulation of ideas already present in Plato’s Timaeus (78e).
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sensation and of moving in every way. (Galen, Medical Introduction 14,
p. 726.7–11 Kühn = Long & Sedley 47 N; tr. after Long & Sedley)
As is common in their natural philosophy, the Stoics differentiate species of
internal ‘breath’ as peculiar to objects within nature according to
a hierarchy: all objects share of, or participate in, the cosmic kind of
internal ‘breath’, i.e. the ‘tenor’ that not only uniﬁes the entire kosmos
and all the parts that belong to it, but also the ‘tenor’ that individualises
complex and simple bodies, such as wise animals like Socrates of Athens or
the Kosmos; animals that cannot achieve virtue and wisdom such as
Aristotle’s bull; plants such as this rose; and metals and stones like this
piece of iron. At a higher level, the species of ‘breath’ that provides
nutrition for growth is reserved from wise animals, unwise animals and
plants, is ‘physical’ or ‘natural’; stones and metals do not possess it. One
step up is the kind of breath that animate objects, wise or unwise, possess:
Galen calls it ‘animate’, or related to ‘soul’ traditionally understood as life-
force that is manifest through sense perception. Galen does not explain
here what sort of ‘breath’ is unique to wise animals such as Socrates and the
Kosmos,42 although the passage implies that there is more to the story than
what he is telling.
In order to pursue this line of thought, we now need to turn to another
philosopher with strong Platonist and Stoic commitments, in concert with
a remarkably deep commitment to his Jewish faith: Philo of Alexandria,
a philosopher who was probably writing about 125 years after the other
Stoic we have been discussing so far, Posidonius. We are now ﬁrmly in
what is often called the Post-Hellenistic intellectual world, where the
destruction of the philosophical schools in Athens in the 80s bce (the
Academy and the Lyceum) was offset by the increased production of
philosophical texts circulating throughout the Mediterranean. The effect
of these changes was a brilliant and enigmatic kind of eclecticism. In the
Post-Hellenistic world, pagan philosophy and Semitic religions coexist and
inform one another without any obvious contradiction. As we will see in
the case of Philo, pagan philosophy provides the explanatory models for
biblical exegesis: rather than appeal to other Jewish exegetical texts in order
to compose his own analysis of the book of Genesis, Philo looks to Plato,
Aristotle, the Stoics and the Pythagoreans for guidance on how to interpret
the infallible words of Yahweh.
42 The notion that the kosmos was ‘living’ is implicit in Aristotle’s account of Pythagorean cosmology
(see earlier), but it was made explicit in Plato’s Timaeus (see esp. Ti. 30b–d), although Plato did not
commit to anthropological analogising of the World-Soul.
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13.4 Philo of Alexandria and the Pneumatic Consubstantiation
Philo of Alexandria helps us to understand better how wise animals, such as
Socrates and the Kosmos, can be thought to possess a pneumatic capacity
beyond that of other individual substances in nature. Our ﬁrst piece of
evidence helps to understand, in particular, how ‘tenor’ is thought to work,
but also mentions the highest species of breath, what binds bodies together
‘by rational soul’:
He [God] bound some bodies by tenor [ἕξει], others by physique [φύσει],
others by soul [ψυχῇ], and others by rational soul [λογικῇ ψυχῇ]. In stones,
and logs which have been severed from their physical connection [sc. to the
tree], he created tenor which is the strongest bond. This is breath which
turns back towards itself [ἡ δὲ ἐστι πνεῦμα ἀναστρέφον ἐφ’ ἑαυτό]. It begins
to extend itself from the centre to the extremities, and having made contact
with the outer surfaces it bends back again until it returns to the same place
from which it ﬁrst set out. (Philo of Alexandria, God’s Immutability 35–6 =
Long & Sedley 47 Q; tr. by Long & Sedley)
‘Tenor’ so constructed is a kind of back-turning force that bonds material
parts together into a compound, something like a magnetic polarity. It
functions as a sort of circulatory system, moving around the object’s
interior and hence uniting it like a sort of ‘glue’.43 According to Philo,
‘tenor’ extends to all objects, living or lifeless, including not only stones
and logs, mentioned here, but also bones, ‘which resemble stones’, as he
says in Allegories of the Laws (2.22–3 = L&S 47 P).44Hence, objects like logs
that have been separated from their natural origin for growth still possess
the lowest form of breath – the same, we might wonder, could extend to,
for example, severed limbs – at least until they begin to decay. Indeed, in
theQuestions and Answers on Genesis (2.4 = L&S 47 R), which survives only
in a medieval Armenian translation from Greek, Philo explains that God is
said to have commanded Noah to tar the ark both on the outside and the
inside (Genesis 6:14), because all things derive their natural unity from the
external and internal types of ‘tenor’; the former is the corporeal type of
tenor, which ﬁxes the external boundaries of an individual human being;
the latter is said to be his soul, which also circulates from the centre to the
periphery rotationally. Hence, Philo appears to believe that humans – and
Noah’s Ark – possess two types of ‘tenor’, external and internal,
43 The circulation metaphor is implied by the use of the term ἀναστρέφον, which is employed by Plato
to refer to the circulation of blood within the veins (Ti. 85c).
44 According to Diogenes Laertius (7.138–39 = L&S 47 O), breath pervades the body of an animal as
‘tenor’ at the point of its bones and sinews.
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corresponding to the body and the soul.45 About the highest ‘rational’ type
of ‘breath’ in Philo’s view, we will have to embark on an analysis of his
exegetical works on Genesis, which requires us to go on a brief digression
about the rise of ‘exegetical’ texts in the Post-Hellenistic world.
One major difference between Hellenistic and Post-Hellenistic intellec-
tual cultures and philosophy is the formal emergence of an exegetical
habit.46 Prior to the dissolution of the philosophical schools in Athens in
the 80s bce, we have little direct evidence of dedicated exegetical practice
with regard to what we might consider ‘wisdom-texts’, ranging from
Homer and the Hebrew Bible to Plato’s dialogues. Within the Platonist
and Stoic schools, however, works that seek to explain what meanings,
concepts, themes, and systems of ethics underlie wisdom-texts become
codiﬁed into recognisable genres, and thus is born what is often generally
understood to be the ‘commentary tradition’. This represents an expansion
of a genre of scientiﬁc literature that is often considered to have originated
with the writings of Aristotle on Homer, and one might refer to this sort of
scientiﬁc literature as ‘zetetic’, after the title of a lost work that comes down
to us (the Homeric Zetemata, or, more colloquially, the Homeric
Questions).47 It is under the ‘zetetic’ genre of scientiﬁc literature that we
should classify the work of Philo’s that gives us his own unique point of
view on ‘breath’ and its importance for the microcosm of the human being
and the macrocosm of the ordered universe. As we saw earlier, this ‘zetetic’
genre tended to produce, for analysis, a single lemma of a wisdom-text and
attempt to ‘explain’ it by appeal to lexical, philosophical, or ethical
principles:48 Philo quotes Genesis 6:14 (‘Make yourself an ark of cypress’
wood; make rooms in the ark, and cover it inside and out with pitch’) and
proceeds to use philosophical axioms to ‘explain’ what it was that God,
whose word is of course perfect, said to Noah.49 This genre presupposes
a surplus of meaning in the wisdom-text that goes beyond mere literal
interpretation, and it exhibits a deeply embedded commitment to
45 This could create taxonomic confusions, but it may be that the text as translated fromAucher’s Latin
(printed in SVF) by Long and Sedley, and informed by the recent translations from the Armenian by
Marcus and Mercier, is unclear.
46 On exegetical approaches in Post-Hellenistic philosophy, see Boys-Stones 2001: Chapters 3 and 6.
On Philo speciﬁcally, see Boys-Stones 2001: 90–95.
47 A good recent discussion of this genre, and Aristotle’s use of it, is Mayhew 2015. Of course, the
posing of questions about Homer’s words is anticipated by earlier intellectuals, but I am not aware
that this activity constituted a genre as such.
48 Here one might point to comparanda in Porphyry’s Homeric Questions on the Iliad (see the recent
edition of Macphail 2011) and Plutarch’s Homeric Studies (Fragments 122–27 Sandbach).
49 For a fuller assessment of Philo’s Platonism/Stoicism and its relationship to exegesis of the Hebrew
Bible, see Engberg-Pederson 2010: 22–26.
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teleology and epistemological positivism: because God’s word, transmitted
through his medium Moses, is perfect, it is the exegete’s responsibility to
employ his capacities to unpack what it was that God meant, i.e. why he
said it.50 Implicit is the assumption that human beings are capable of
obtaining knowledge (or at least justiﬁed true belief) about what God
said or the prophets wrote. In this way, we now begin to see how it
would be possible for Christianity, which arose in the second half of the
ﬁrst century ce (just after what is thought to be the date of Philo’s death in
50 ce), to obtain its own unique character both (1) in the relief of pagan
philosophy, which was well established, and (2) in response to philosophi-
cal-exegetical traditions already in place in Hellenic Jewish communities,
such as Alexandria.
The imprimatur for approaching the formation of the macrocosm (i.e.
the universe) and the microcosm (i.e. the human being) for Jewish and
Christian authors was the ﬁrst chapter of Genesis, which expressly pre-
sented a pneumatic cosmogony:
In the beginning, God created the heaven and the earth. And the earth was
formless and lacked arrangement [ἀόρατος καὶ ἀκατασκεύαστος], and
a darkness lay upon the deep, and a breath of God was borne over the
water [πνεῦμα θεοῦ ἐπεφέρετο ἐπάνω τοῦ ὕδατος]. And God said, ‘let there
be light’. And there was light. (Genesis 1:1–3, translated from the Greek
version of the Septuagint)51
The pneumatic cosmogony of Genesis is remarkable for its divergence
from the Pythagorean tradition discussed earlier: for the Pythagoreans, it is
the kosmos itself that ﬁrst breathes in, whereas Genesis has God acting as
a sort of prime breather in the process of differentiating the parts of the
kosmos.52A parallel passage of Genesis that Philo and the writers of the New
Testament devoted a signiﬁcant amount of effort to explaining and
expanding is Chapter 2, verse 7: ‘And God formed the man by taking
clay from the earth, and breathed into his face a breath of life (ἐνεφῦσησεν
εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς), and the man became a living soul’.53
In his Allegorical Interpretation of Genesis 2 and 3, Philo devotes a long
50 Cf. Barclay 1996: 169.
51 For texts of the Hebrew Bible, I work from the Greek translation of the Septuagint, because it is
almost certainly the text known to and used by Philo and the writers of the New Testament.
52 As contrasted with an Aristotelian notion of a prime mover. In Mesopotamian cosmology, the
Enuma Elish similarly features wind as a cosmogonic force that Marduk employs in conquering
Tiamat and shaping the parts of the universe (Tablets IV–V).
53 It is remarkable that Augustine sought to prove that Plato’s views about the separation of the
elements in Timaeus were substantially related to the pneumatic cosmogony of Genesis (De civ.
D. 8.11).
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stretch of text (1.31–42) to a multifaceted explanation of this potent state-
ment, which links the construction of the primal human being (Adam) to
God’s cultivation of humankind and the activity of intellective
‘inspiration’.54 A sufﬁcient analysis of Philo’s exegesis would occupy far
more space than I am allotted, so I will focus on the aspects of his account
that help to ﬁll out the conceptualisation of ‘breath’ as an intelligent
sustaining force.
Philo breaks down the passage with a lexical and philological analysis,
and he focuses on the meanings of key individual terms that require further
explanation. One of these terms is the ‘in-breathing’ (ἐνεφῦσησεν) men-
tioned by Moses:
‘Breathed into’ [ἐνεφῦσησεν], we note, is equivalent to ‘inspired’ or ‘be-souled’
the soulless [τῷ ἐνέπνευσεν ἢ ἐψύχωσε τὰ ἄψυχα]; for God forbid that we
should be infected with suchmonstrous folly as to think that God employs for
in-breathing organs such as mouth or nostrils; for God is not only not in the
form of man, but belongs to no class or kind. Yet the expression clearly brings
out something that accords with nature. For it implies of necessity three
things: that which in-breathes, that which receives, that which is in-
breathed: that which in-breathes is God [τὸ ἐμπνέον ἐστὶν ὁ θεός], that
which receives is the intellect [τὸ δεχόμενον ὁ νοῦς], that which is in-
breathed is breath [τὸ ἐμπνεόμενον τὸ πνεῦμα]. What, then, do we infer
from these premises? A union [ἕνωσις] of the three comes about, as God
extends the power [τείναντος . . . τὴν δύναμιν] that proceeds from Himself
through the mediant breath till it reaches the subject. And for what purpose
save that wemay obtain a conception [ἔννοια] ofHim? For how could the soul
have conceived of God had He not breathed into it and mightily laid hold of
it? For the human intellect [ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς] would never have ventured to
soar so high as to grasp the nature of God, had not God Himself drawn it up
to Himself, so far as it was possible that the human intellect should be drawn
up, and stamped it with the impress of the powers that are within the scope of
its understanding. (Philo of Alexandria, Allegorical Interpretation of Genesis 2
and 3, 1.36–38; tr. after Colson and Whittaker)
In this remarkable passage, we see the expansion of an idea of ‘breath’ that
is already present in the Stoic constructions mentioned earlier: the idea that
there is an ‘active’ and ‘passive’ element. For Philo, however, there is
a tripartition – indeed, a trinity produced anthropogonically: the ‘active’
element is God (here functioning as something like efﬁcient cause); the
‘passive’ element is the human mind (notably, not the body or the lower
54 He also commits extensive analysis of this lemma in his On the Creation (46.143–40), where he
explains why human beings are superior to other animals. On God as cultivator, see Questions and
Answers on Genesis 1.50.
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parts of the soul); and the medium of transferal of divine power is the
breath itself. Interestingly, Philo follows the other Stoics in seeing breath as
what constitutes a ‘unity’ (ἕνωσις) or synthesis of corporeal objects relative
to one another, and that this unity signiﬁes the conferral of the divine
power that ‘extends’ (τείναντος) from God to Adam, the ‘earthly man’.55
The language used suggests that he is referring to the breath as ‘tension’
(συντονία) between objects in the kosmos.56 But Philo goes further,
explaining that God breathed into Adam not simply for the sake of bring-
ing him to life, like other creatures, but speciﬁcally so as to make it possible
for Adam, and by extension all of his progeny, to know God; for, without
the unity that is achieved through ‘in-breathing’, it is implied, Man would
never be able to conceptualise (sc. ἔννοια) God. It is implied that since
Moses does not mention God ‘in-breathing’ into other animals, they in
fact lack higher intellectual capacities and cannot know God.57
Finally, once the human ‘intellect’ has received the divine breath of
God, how does it relate to the other parts of the soul and body? Philo
explains (1.39–40) that God is not said by Moses to breathe into other
parts, ‘whether senses or organs of utterance and of reproduction; for these
are secondary in capacity’. Hence, so Philo asks, by what were the organs of
sensation, speech, and reproduction ‘in-breathed’ (ἐνεπνεύσθη)? The
answer is that the intellect breathes into them:
For the intellect [νοῦς] imparts the portion of the soul that is devoid of
reason a share of that which it received from God, so that the intellect was
be-souled by God, but the unreasoning part by the intellect. For the intellect
is, so to speak, ‘God’ of the unreasoning part. In like manner he does not
hesitate to speak of Moses as ‘a God to Pharoah’ [Exod. 7.1]. For, of the
things which come into being, some come into being both by God’s power
and through God’s agency, while others come into being by God’s power by
not by His agency. The most excellent things were made both by God and
by God’s agency . . . to these the intellect belongs; but the part devoid of
55 Philo has already (1.31–32) confusedly established that the human being who was created in this act
was in fact not the ‘heavenly Man’ who is described as ‘being made after the image of God’ and
‘altogether without part or lot in corruptible and terrestrial substance’, but instead the ‘terrestrial
man’ who is said to be ‘compacted out of the matter scattered here and there’. One could speculate
that the former exists only in the mind of God. We will later on see that Paul alters this story of two
‘Adams’ to make the ﬁrst Adam, created by God, the ‘terrestrial’ Adam, and Jesus into the
‘heavenly’ one.
56 As Engberg-Pederson writes (2010: 20), ‘what distinguishes nous and psyche – and, indeed, physis and
hexis – from one another as so many forms of the material pneuma is the degree of tension (tonos) to
be found in either. In nous the tension of the pneuma is so strong that it may cover the whole world
and reach the stars.’
57 Cf. Philo, On the Creation 65–70.
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reason was made by God’s power but not by God’s agency, but by [the
agency] of the reasonable part [τὸ λογικόν] which rules and holds dominion
in the soul. (Philo of Alexandria, Allegorical Interpretation of Genesis 2 and 3,
1.40–41; tr. after Colson and Whittaker)
Philo sets up a strict hierarchy of ‘in-breathing’, related to the animation of
the many parts that make up the ﬁrst human being: God breathes into the
intellective part of the soul the activity of reasoning, whereas the intellec-
tive part of the soul passes on what it has of the divine pneumatic power to
the lower, irrational part of the soul. The analogy is drawn: just as God is
to reason, so reason is to unreason. Hence, God’s capacity58 imparts breath
to both the human’s intellect and to the irrational part of his soul, but his
agency – his direct engagement as efﬁcient cause, so to say – only happens
with the intellect. The agent or efﬁcient cause of the lower part of the soul’s
animation is the rational part of the soul, the intellect who is placed over
and above it as its ruler.
Hence, the major contribution to the history of cosmogonic and
anthropogonic breath made by Philo is the adaptation of the Stoic meta-
physics into a unique epistemological and ethical system: in his exegesis of
the anthropogony in Genesis, Philo ﬁnds the grounds for differentiation of
human and other animal intellective capacities, rooted in a notion of the
divine gift of breath. It is a further expression of God’s cosmogonic will, as
paradigmatically testiﬁed by His ﬁrst act as efﬁcient cause of the universe,
when His breath was borne upon the waters of the void (Gen. 1:1). And, as
is often the case in the ancient world, the so-called Praise of Man and his
superior intellectual capacities brings in tow ethical and moral implications
that reach far beyond the parameters of bare scientiﬁc explanation, such as
we have seen in the cosmogony and anthropogony of the Pythagoreans. It
only remains, now, to see how ancient notions of ‘breath’ arrive at their
most powerful and inﬂuential formulation, in the writings of the New
Testament.
13.5 Consubstantiation Expanded: The New Testament and the
Christian Community
With the writings of the New Testament, we see emerge a somewhat
haphazard, but nevertheless deeply informed, cosmic theology of ‘breath/
spirit’ (πνεῦμα): it shares much in common with Philo’s exegesis of divine
58 If indeed this is what is meant by the phrase ὑπὸ θεοῦ, as contrasted with δι’ αὐτοῦ, which must
mean ‘through Him’, i.e. ‘by God’s agency’.
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‘breath’ across the works we have surveyed in brief, including, as we will
see, a similar ideation of what I am calling ‘consubstantiation’, and it also
demonstrates a kind of parallelism with the Stoic cosmological pneumatics
described by Posidonius. It is worth checking to see whether this is the case
across all the texts of the New Testament, or if it only applies in some
instances. One representative version of the divine conception via a special
kind of ‘breath’, the Holy Spirit (τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα),59 appears in the Gospel
of Matthew:
Now the birth of Jesus the Messiah took place in this way.When his mother
Mary had been engaged to Joseph, but before they lived together, she was
found to be with child from the Holy Spirit [ἐν γαστρὶ ἔχουσα ἐκ
πνεύματος ἁγίου]. Her husband Joseph, being a righteous man and unwill-
ing to expose her to public disgrace, planned to dismiss her quietly. But just
when he resolved to do this, an angel of the Lord appeared to him in a dream
and said, ‘Joseph, son of David, do not be afraid to take Mary as your wife,
for the child conceived in her is from the Holy Spirit [τὸ γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ
γεννηθὲν ἐκ πνεύματός ἐστιν ἁγίου]. She will bear a son, and you are to
name him Jesus, for he will save his people from their sins’. (Gospel of
Matthew 1:18–21; translation in NRSV)60
In the context of the philosophical treatment of breath that we have seen
earlier, this seemingly familiar passage becomes defamiliarised: the repeti-
tion of the phrase ‘from the Holy Spirit’ (ἐκ πνεύματος ἁγίου) with regard
to Mary’s pregnancy and Jesus’ conception indicates its importance, and
we are invited to wonder about the precise inﬂection of ‘out of’ or ‘from’
(ἐκ). It is initially unclear whether the author of the Gospel of Matthew
is ascribing any agency to the Holy Spirit: it may seem that the Holy Spirit
is the stuff or material out of which the impregnation and conception
occurs, or that the Holy Spirit is the instrument that makes it
possible for impregnation and conception. And these would be reasonable
interpretations that would follow from Philo’s discussion of ‘breath’. But
a non-philosophical alternative, perfectly acceptable in Greek, is a usage of
ἐκ + genitive that refers to parentage, and we would translate it agentially
with the phrase ‘by X’.61 Hence, a non-philosophical translation that
59 I translate ‘Holy Spirit’ according to convention, but it should be noted that ‘spirit’ and ‘breath’ are
the same word in Greek (πνεῦμα), and the term ἅγιον πνεῦμα translates literally to ‘holy breath’.
The Gospel of Matthew has various terms that are traditionally assimilated to the Holy Spirit,
including ‘spirit of God’ (πνεύμα θεοῦ, 12:28) and ‘spirit of the father’ (τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ πατρὸς,
10:20).
60 Throughout this section, I modify the NRSV only when I believe that the terms used have speciﬁc
philosophical antecedents that are of relevance to this discussion (such as in the writings of Paul).
61 See Smyth 1920: 1688.
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retains Greek colloquy would rather be ‘found to be pregnant by the Holy
Spirit’ or ‘conceived in her by the Holy Spirit’, and given the context here
of Jesus’ potentially dubious parentage, I would suggest this colloquial,
non-philosophical usage is the best for this passage.
It is perhaps not so surprising, given the pneumatic cosmogony and
anthropogony in Genesis, that the birth of Jesus would involve a similar
transmission of divine breath. But, as is well known, the ‘Holy Spirit’
features in a variety of places in the Gospels and receives a multifaceted
treatment throughout those works, sometimes in reference to certain parts
of the Hebrew Bible.62 For the purpose of my argument here, I start with
the Gospels before turning to Paul’s writings. In the account of the Gospel
of Luke 1:35, an angel explains to Mary that ‘the Holy Spirit will come
upon’ her (πνεῦμα ἅγιον ἐπελεύσεται ἐπὶ σέ), and ‘the power of the
Highest will overshadow’ her (δύναμις ὑψίστου ἐπισκιάσει σοι). The
semantics here make it sound like the impregnation is a kind of physical
invasion, a sort of ‘climbing upon’ Mary, perhaps recalling God’s breath
being borne upon the water (πνεῦμα θεοῦ ἐπεφέρετο ἐπάνω τοῦ ὕδατος)
in the primal cosmogonic act of Genesis.63 Moreover, the Holy Spirit also
appears to be responsible for impregnating Elisabeth with John the Baptist,
if this is what is meant by referring to her as ‘ﬁlled up’ (ἐπλήσθη πνεύματος
ἁγίου) with it (Luke 1:41–43). By communicating divine information from
heaven in the ‘corporeal form’ (σωματικῷ εἴδει) of the dove, it motivates
the second, higher kind of baptism (Luke 3:15–21, 4:1; cf. the simpler
version ofMark 1:10–13).64 It also motivates prophesy and inspires teaching
(Luke 1:67; Luke 4:14). It itself acts as a teacher and, even, an advocate for
Jesus after his death, transmitting his words posthumously (John 14:15–26
and 16:13–15).65 Finally, when Jesus dies (Luke 23:46), after darkness has
fallen upon the land, Jesus calls out to His Father and screams ‘into your
hands I commend my spirit’ (εἰς χεῖράς σου παρατίθεμαι τὸ πνεῦμά μου),
after which, so Luke states brutally, ‘he breathed his last’ (ἐξέπνευσεν).66
Thus, in Luke’s colourful and sensitive narrative, Jesus’ birth and death
62 See e.g. the citation/translation of Isaiah 61:1 at Luke 4:18.
63 Gen. 1:3, employing the Septuagint’s translation.
64 Not only does it inform Jesus that he is the son of God; it also leads Jesus into the wilderness to be
tempted. The inclusion of the qualifying marker ‘in corporeal shape’ here indicates that the breath
itself is incorporeal, contrary to Stoic assumptions. It should be remarked that Luke, also likely
a Hellenic Jew from Antioch, was said by Paul to have been a physician (Col. 4:14).
65 In the Gospel ofMark, it will act on behalf of his disciples when they are arraigned, even speaking for
them on trial (Mark 13:11).
66 Luke places a certain emphasis on ‘breath’ through Jesus’ quotation of Psalm 31:5, which is wholly
absent from the accounts of Mark (15:33–37) and Matthew (27:49–50).
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occur in parallel circumstances, with the transaction of breath between
God and Man, and the settling down of shadows.
Other works of the New Testament, including the Acts of the Apostles
(which presents itself as a sequel to the Gospel of Luke)67 and the writings
of the Apostle Paul (especially Romans and 1 Corinthians), feature more
elaborate pneumatic systems for early Christianity. There, we see a simple
cosmological spiritualism contrasted against one more groundbreaking
and radical. Speaking in Acts (17:24–25) of the ‘kosmos and everything in
it’ (ὁ κόσμος καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ) that God created, Paul asserts that
God has no need of human works because it is He himself who has given to
humans ‘life, and breath, and all things’ (ἀυτὸς διδοὺς πᾶσι ζωὴν καὶ
πνοὴν καὶ τὰ πάντα). One suspects that ‘breath’ (πνοή) in this circum-
stance is not the same thing as the Holy Spirit, but simply the breath of life.
Indeed, there are indications in Letter to the Ephesians that when he speaks
of the κόσμος, Paul refers to the world that is subject to birth and destruc-
tion, and not to the heavenly realm that is pervaded with the Holy Spirit.68
Elsewhere in Acts, the Holy Spirit becomes the primary medium for the
transmission of Jesus’ teachings, and even the catalyst for speaking pro-
phesy among the disciples themselves. Importantly, there is the idea that
the Holy Spirit, like Philo’s divine breath, possesses its own inherent power
but transmits its information through intermediary vessels, in this case the
Apostles. The martyr Stephen receives the wisdom of the Holy Spirit only
to have his audiences reject his word and brand him a heretic (Acts 6:3–5,
6:8–15, 6:55–56); and as they stone him to death in the presence of Saul
(7:58–59), he imitates Jesus when he too breathes out his ﬁnal words: ‘Lord
Jesus, receive my breath’ (Κύριε Ἰησοῦ, δέξαι τὸ πνεῦμά μου). The transi-
tion from Jesus to Stephen as ‘recipient’ serves to highlight the transitional
power of the divine breath: just as Jesus receives the Holy Spirit from God
the Father, so too Stephen receives it from Jesus the Son. And on and on.
There is a relatively consistent pattern here: a chain of disciples is estab-
lished, and the passing of divine breath on from disciple to disciple, in the
form of the Holy Spirit, reveals itself as the perpetual re-enactment of the
original divine activities of in-breathing of both Adam and Jesus. The Holy
Spirit becomes the vehicle for the transmission of God’s power from
generation to generation, thus constituting and sustaining the Christian
community over time. It becomes the vehicle for the Christian body of
67 The narrator ‘Luke’ begins the Acts 1:1–2 by saying, ‘In the ﬁrst book, Theophilius, I wrote about all
that Jesus did and taught from the beginning until the day when he was taken up into heaven, after
giving instructions through the Holy Spirit to the apostles whom he had chosen’.
68 Eph. 1:3 and 2:2. Also see Col. 2:4 and 2:20.
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adherents – a cosmopolitan expression of Stoic pneumatology, with the
shift of focus from the universe to the human individual.
When we turn to the writings of Paul, the pneumatology starts to
dovetail more strictly with its expression in the writings of Philo, the
Stoics and the Pythagoreans. As Troels Engberg-Pederson has noted exten-
sively, the work of Paul that most effectively situates his thought in
a broader philosophical present is 1 Corinthians.69 The Holy Spirit there
takes on certain powers that reﬂect what appears to be philosophical
training, or at least familiarity, on Paul’s part. For example, in 1
Corinthians 12, a short digression entitled ‘On the Spiritual [Gifts]’ (Περὶ
τῶν πνευματικῶν),70 Paul develops an elaborate description of how the
Holy Spirit uniﬁes the community under Christ:
Now there are divisions [διαιρέσεις] of gifts, but the same Spirit [τὸ αὐτὸ
πνεῦμα]; and there are divisions of services, but the same Lord [ὁ αὐτὸς
κύριος]; and there are divisions of activities, but it is the same God who
activates all of them in everyone [ὁ ἐνεργῶν τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν]. To each is
given the manifestation of the Spirit [φανέρωσις τοῦ πνεύματος] for the
common good. To one is given through the Spirit the utterance of wisdom
[λόγος σοφίας], and to another the utterance of knowledge according to the
same Spirit [λόγος γνώσεως κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα], to another gifts of
healing by the one Spirit, to another the working of miracles, to another
prophecy, to another the discernment of spirits [διακρίσεις πνευμάτων], to
another various kinds of tongues, to another the interpretation of tongues
[ἑρμηνεία γλωσσῶν]. All these are activated by the one and the same Spirit
[ἐνεργεῖ τὸ ἕν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα], who allots to each individually just as
the Spirit chooses. For just as the body is one and has many members, and
all the members of the body, thoughmany, are one body, so it is with Christ.
For in the one Spirit we were all baptized into one body – Jews or Greeks,
slaves or free – and we were all made to drink of one Spirit. (1 Corinthians
12:4–13, translation after NRSV)
As the passage demonstrates, Paul marshals a range of concepts familiar
from Hellenistic and Post-Hellenistic philosophy (‘the same breath’, or
alternatively ‘the breath itself’ (τὸ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα); ‘activates/activity’
(ἐνεργῶν; ἐνεργεῖ); ‘differentiation/discernment’ (διαιρέσεις; διακρίσεις);
‘the speech/reasoning of wisdom’ (λόγος σοφίας); ‘the speech/reasoning of
knowledge’ (λόγος γνώσεως); ‘the one and the breath itself’ (τὸ ἕν καὶ τὸ
αὐτὸ πνεῦμα)) to make the case that the community of followers of Christ
69 Generally, see Engberg-Pederson 2010.
70 The passage begins with these words, setting the theme. But titles of Greek philosophical and
theological works have the same format: ‘On X’. The digression lasts until Chapter 15.
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is like the body that has many (corporeal) members, all brought into unity
by the ‘one breath’ that is the Holy Spirit. Hence, for Paul, the Holy Spirit
not only unites all the parts of the ‘body of Christ’; it also differentiates
what sorts of activities each person is best suited to do, according to the will
of the Holy Spirit. What, however, is the ontological status of the ‘breath’
that unites the Christian body, assigns each part of it its proper function,
and renders the whole compound wise and capable of understanding God
and his wisdom, which is otherwise ‘secret and hidden’?71 In order to gain
ground on this issue, we need to consider Paul’s rereading of the primordial
anthropogony in Genesis 2:7, which I mentioned earlier:
If there is an animate body [σῶμα ψυχικόν], then there is a spiritual body
too [καὶ πνευματικόν]. Thus it is written: ‘The ﬁrst man, Adam, became
a living being’; the last Adam became a life-giving Spirit [ὁ ἔσχατοςἈδὰμ εἰς
πνεῦμα ζῳοποιοῦν]. But it is not the spiritual that is ﬁrst, but the animate,
and then the spiritual. The ﬁrst man was from the earth, a man of dust;
the second man is from heaven. As was the man of dust, so are those who are
of the dust; and as is the man of heaven, so are those who are of heaven. Just
as we have borne the image of the man of dust, we will also bear the image
of the man of heaven [φορέσομεν καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐπουρανίου].
(1 Corinthians 15.44–49; translation after NRSV)
Just as we saw with Philo above, Paul differentiates two sorts of ‘Adams’, by
reference to his exegesis of Genesis 2:7. For Philo (Allegorical Interpretation
of Genesis 2 and 3, 1.31–32), there is a heavenly or cosmic Adam who was
‘made after the image of God’ and ‘altogether without part or lot in
corruptible and terrestrial substance’, as contrasted with the ‘terrestrial
Adam’ who is said to be ‘compacted out of the matter scattered here and
there’; for Paul, the ‘last’ or heavenly Adam is Christ, the ‘life-giving Spirit’
(πνεῦμα ζῳοποιοῦν) that constitutes the spiritual body of the community
of Christians, whereas the terrestrial Adam is the ﬁgure whomGod created
on the sixth day, the ‘man of dust’. It is true, as Engberg-Pederson has
argued impressively by reference to this passage, that Paul is employing
Stoic terms and concepts, reﬂecting his intellectual environs and reacting
to Philonic exegesis.72 But that is not everything. Through the act of
differentiating the ‘animate’ from the ‘pneumatic’ Christian bodies, Paul
effectively appropriates the kinds of theological speculation found in the
writings of Philo (and no doubt other philosophical Hellenic Jews whose
works we have lost) to reject their accounts, and to highlight the status of
the human being with reference to divine breath as incomplete in the
71 See 1 Cor. 2:6–13. 72 Engberg-Pederson 2010: 26–31.
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account of Moses.73 In doing so, he establishes the theological foundations
of Christianity with characteristic aplomb, reconstructing it out of the
scattered and even perhaps eclectic material that constituted Hellenic Jews’
unique blend of Platonist metaphysics, Stoic physics and Jewish biblical
exegesis. Consubstantiation within the Christian community now goes
beyond Philo’s Stoic trinity of ‘God, Adam, Breath’, or the Gospels’
‘Father, Son, Holy Spirit’: it reaches across the entire body of Christ’s
followers, from the death and rebirth of the ‘last Adam’ until the ﬁnal
return after the Judgement.
13.6 Conclusions
In tracing a particular genealogy of spiritual cosmologies from the early
Pythagoreans of the ﬁfth century bce to the writers of the New Testament
in the mid to late ﬁrst century ce, we have examined how various notions
of ‘breath’ (πνεῦμα) have informed the description of the ordered world
(κόσμος). Most notably, we have seen a shift away from employing ‘breath’
as a biomorphic instrument for explanation of how individuals obtain
proper order and differentiation in the thought of the Pythagoreans and
Stoics to a prime candidate for supplementing incomplete understandings
of human creation and salvation in the writings of Philo and the authors of
the NewTestament.While conceptualisations of the kosmos have remained
static, for the most part, the notion of ‘breath’ has expanded and become
more comprehensive as we have proceeded through the Hellenistic to the
Post-Hellenistic world. Despite these important connections, no revolu-
tion in spiritual cosmology in the Greco-Roman world can be said to be
greater than what occurred among the Early Christians. Speaking to the
apostle Philip in the Gospel of John, Jesus promises to intercede on behalf
of his followers and request from His Father an intercessor, to act on their
behalf:
If you love me, you will keep my commandments. And I will ask the Father,
and He will give you another advocate, in order that I might be with you for
all of eternity [εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα], the Spirit of Truth [τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας],
which the kosmos does not have the capacity to grasp [ὃ ὁ κόσμος οὐ δύναται
λαβεῖν], because it does not contemplate it and it does not know it [ὅτι οὐ
θεωρεῖ αὐτὸ οὐδὲ γινώσκει]; you know it, because it abides by you, and it
73 Cf. Boys-Stones 2001: 165–67. For Paul’s account of the restoration of the kosmos through Christ as
‘life-giving Spirit’ (πνεῦμα ζῳοποιοῦν), see White 2008: 103–4.
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will be in you [ὑμεῖς γινώσκετε αὐτό, ὅτι παρ’ ὑμῖν μένει καὶ ἐν ὑμῖν
ἔσται].74 (Gospel of John 14:15–17)
Here we see the most compelling evidence of the Christian rejection of
the spiritual kosmos of ancient Greek philosophy for an alternative
spiritualism. Whereas the Pythagorean kosmos obtained its birth from
an act of breathing in the external void, and the Stoic kosmos persisted
uniquely through the reciprocal activities of respiration, the kosmos as
described by John is blind and deaf to the Spirit of Truth, neither
recognising it nor contemplating it. This is neither the biomorphic
kosmos of the Pythagoreans, nor the intelligent kosmos of the Stoics:
this kosmos is wholly bereft of the Spirit of Truth, which functions here
as the eternal guarantor of co-presence with Jesus. Cosmic and human
pneumatic analogies have been rejected and replaced with a new sense of
the Spirit of Truth (τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας), which the kosmos is unable
to admit due to its insufﬁciency. Hence, in the Gospel of John, we
witness the ultimate rejection of the pagan spiritual cosmologies – with
all their metaphysical and physical entailments – of the Pythagoreans,
Stoics, and Hellenic Jews, and their replacement with the eternal com-
munity of Christian believers, uniﬁed through the Holy Spirit, and not
limited by this kosmos.
To be sure, this rejection of pagan spiritual cosmologies is not a total
abandonment of the principle of kosmos. As Engberg-Pederson has argued
in speaking about Paul’s spiritualism, ‘pneuma . . . is an entity that is
primarily connected with being in the group. It highlights a certain stable
state of the believer.’75 As far as Paul’s ethics of belief go, we should note
that, for Engberg-Pederson, πνεῦμα ‘is stated to be responsible for certain
states of mind, namely mental attitudes, in fact for nothing other than the
virtues in the Greek philosophical tradition’.76 This represents a notable
shift away from what we saw in the Stoics and Philo, who attributed to
‘breath’ notions of intelligence and discriminatory capacity, but did not
take the further step of advancing upon moral psychology. Moreover,
because of its importance for community-building among the Christians,
theHoly Spirit, or the Spirit of Truth, possesses eschatological signiﬁcance:
after all, it is the guarantee of (among other things) a post-Apocalyptic
community of believers that makes Christianity attractive within the
competitive intellectual and religious economy of the early Roman
74 Translation mine; italics mine, for emphasis. 75 Engberg-Pederson 2000: 158.
76 Ibid., 160, by reference to the virtues of love, joy, peacefulness, magnanimity, kindness, goodness,
loyalty, mildness and self-control (Galatians 5: 22–23).
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Empire.77 In this light, consider the prophetic vision offered to John of
Patmos – effected by the Holy Spirit (Revelation 1:10, 21:10) – of the
promised invitation to the city of New Jerusalem:
The Spirit and the bride say, ‘Come’.
And let everyone who hears say, ‘Come’.
We are meant to understand that the Holy Spirit, wed to its ‘bride’, the city
of New Jerusalem (Revelation 21:2, 21:9), calls those who have heeded the
words of John’s book. All this is an expression of the heaven and earth that
are revealed after the ﬁnal Judgement, New Heaven and New Earth
(Revelation 21:1), where there will be no more darkness of night, banished
by the light that is God diffused throughout New Jerusalem (Revelation
22:5) – a second banishment of the darkness of the void from Genesis. This
place is what John of Patmos calls the ‘holy city’ (ἡ πόλις ἁγίη): it is
constituted through the binding of the Holy Spirit to the bride and
presented as a place of unity for those who have heeded the words of
prophesy. In the end, it is the Christian kosmopolis, heralded by the Holy
Spirit, that manifests a new vision of the kosmos of Greek philosophy.
77 For the usefulness of ‘wisdom’ as a point of comparison among Hellenistic, Jewish and Christian
intellectual communities, see Alexander 2001: 122–26.
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